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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL 
COMMISSION, 
Libelant and Appellant and 
Cross-Respondent, 
-vs.-
CLUB FERACO, et al., 
Libelees and Respondents 
and Cross-Appelalnts. 
Case No. 8649 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT UPON APPEAL 
AND REPLY BRIEF ON CROSS-APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the early morning hours of November 2, 1956, 
Philip Ralph Caldwell, a police officer of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, was in Club Feraco, a so-called non-profit liquor 
locker club, located at 923 South State Street in Salt 
Lake City, Utah (R. 352). While there, Officer Caldwell 
observed Libelee Mary Lou Hooley, a cocktail waitress 
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(R. 473), solicit the sale of alcoholic beverages, he saw 
Leonard Feraco, a bartender ( R. 441), pour and prepare 
said alcoholic drinks and he saw :Mary Lou Hooley serve 
and receive payment for said drinks of alcoholic beverage 
(R. 352-357). He placed Libelees Hooley and Feraco 
under arre.st (R. 355). 
The history of Club Feraco and certain agents of 
Club Feraco i.s a history of illegal liquor sales. Officer 
Caldwell knew this (R. 356, 425, 426, 427). John Wey, 
a bartender of Club Feraco, and Ross Fer.aco, a 
managing officer, had been charged with the illegal sale 
of liquor and had pled guilty thereto (R. 410, 413). He 
had been informed that liquor purchases had been made 
on various occasions (R. -t-27). An agent of the Alcohol 
Tax Unit of the United States Government had pur-
chased a series of "drinks" at Club Feraco (R. 390, 450). 
Mary Lou Hooley, a cocktail waitress of Club Feraco, 
had been charged with the illegal sale of liquor and had 
been found guilty thereof (R. 479). He had been inform-
ed that certain Ogden Police Officers had purchased 
drinks at Club Feraco (R. 430, 457-459). He had been 
told that Club Feraco had a "Retail Liquor Dealers" tax 
stamp frmn the Departn1ent of Internal Revenue (R. 429, 
414-416). Having general knowledge of these and other 
facts and observing the sale above set forth, Officer Cald-
well had "reason to believe·· that one of the businesses 
carried on at the pren1ises .at 923 South State Street in 
Salt Lake City, was in violation of the Utah Liquor 
Control Act (R. 356, 423-431). Officer Caldwell, after 
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arresting Hooley and Leonard Feraco, as above set forth, 
thereupon seized all tangible personal property including 
136 bottles of liquor upon the Club premises and reduced 
said property to his possession according to law (R. 368, 
387-88). He forthwith n1ade cmnplaint before Judge J. 
Patton Neeley, City Judge and Ex-Officio Justice of 
the Peace of Salt Lake City, Utah, against Mary Lou 
Hooley and Leonard Feraco and caused them to appear 
before said court according to law (R. 369, 534, 535). 
Officer Caldwell made a "return" and an "amended 
return" to the District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, 
of said property (R. 1, 22). The court issued a "warrant 
of attachment" to Officer Caldwell directing him to 
"hold safely said property so seized under [his] control 
until discharged by due process of law'' (R. 12, 37). 
November 9, 1956, a "Libel of Information" was 
filed in the District Court of S.alt Lake County and a 
"Notice of Hearing and Order to Show Cause" was 
issued, served and posted (R. 51, 89, 118). The "Libel of 
Information" sought the condemnation and forfeiture 
of the tangible personal property and alcoholic beverages 
seized by Officer Caldwell (R. 51). An "answer" was 
filed by narned Libelees, Club Feraco, Ross Feraco, 
Leonard Feraco and Mary Lou Hooley ( R. 83). In 
said answer Libelees asserted that all tangible personal 
property seized belonged to Club Feraco (R. 83). Var-
ious "clairns" were filed by persons clairning ownership 
in part of the property seized and the claiming parties 
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were made partie~ to the action. A total of nine additional 
claims were filed (R. 67, 80 82 87 120 131 132 141 278) 
' ' ' ' ' , ' . 
The matter being at issue, trial in chief commenced 
November 23, 1956, and concluded after intennittent 
hearing on the 28th day of Xovember, 1956 (R. 349-570). 
Evidence was introduced at the hearing by Libelant 
as to the illegal sale of liquor above described and as 
to the nature of the business being carried on at the 
premises at 923 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Evidence was introduced by Libelees denying the illegal 
sale of liquor and purportedly demonstrating the value 
of eertain property seized (R. 468-562). None of the 
persons who filed "clailns~~ offered evidence to support 
their elaims at that time (R. 349-570). Club Feraco, 
Ross Feraco, Leonard Feraco and ~Iary Lou Hooley at 
the tennination of the hearing moved the court to dis-
mi~~ the .. Libel of Information" (R. 46~ 569). The 
n1atter wa~ taken under advise1nent (R. 5f~ Xovember 
29, 1956, while the matter was under advisement, a 
"rlain1'' was filed on behalf of He1nenway and lloser 
C01npan~·, claiiuing ownership of two cigarette machines 
and the contents thereof (R. 1-1-1). On the 13th day of 
Dece1nber, 1956, while the matter was still under advise-
ment. a ~tipulation prepared b~· counsel for Hemenway 
and l\loser l 10lllpany wa~ pn'8ented to counsel for Libel-
ant and counsel for Libelees Feraeo, Club Feraco, and 
Hooley (H. 1-1-5). The ~tipulation states in part as 
follows: .. That the above-deseribed property [two ciga-
rctt<' 111aehines and conknt~J does not in any way belong 
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I~ 
to s.aid Club Feraco and was kept or used only in con-
nection with the restaurant and beer vending business 
conducted on said pren1ises and was not so kept or used 
in connection with any business that may have been con-
ducted on the premises in violation of the Liquor Control 
Act of the State of Utah" ( R. 145). The court, on the 
19th day of December, 1956, based upon the stipulation 
and by order, released the cigarette n1achines and their 
contents to Hernenway and Moser Company (R. 147). 
The stipulation was signed by counsel for Libelant, 
Counsel for Libelees Feraco, Hooley and Club Feraco 
and counsel for Hemenway and Moser Company. It 
wa.s signed by no other parties (R. 145). 
J anu.ary 7, 1957, the court issued a "Memorandum 
Decision" wherein the court found that intoxicating 
liquors were sold at Club Feraco; that intoxicating 
liquors were sold in the presence of Officer Caldwell; 
that Libelees Hooley, Feraco and Club Feraco, and one 
claimant, Hemenway and Moser Company, had stipulated 
that the restaurant business conducted on the prernises 
was not connected with the illegal liquor business; that 
property illegally seized was not subject to forfeiture; 
that property legally seized was subject to forfeiture 
(R. 148). 
Thereafter, on or about the 22nd day of .Jan., 1957, 
Libelees Hooley, Feraco and Club Feraco, moved the 
court for the return of certain personal property ( R. 
167). Their counsel also filed a stipulation purportedly 
executed by Libelees Feraco, Club Feraco, Hooley, Dohr-
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rnann Hotel Supply Cmnpany, Stevens Rosehill Dairy, 
Cliff Krantz, Morrison Brothers, Hobart Sales Agency, 
Ethel M. Doheny and National Cash Register Company. 
This stipulation provides in part: "That any property 
that may be ordered returned by the above-entitled court 
to said Club Feraco premises may be so retained and 
said claimants hereby forego and relinquish any claim 
thereto asserted in the above-entitled cause as to any of 
said items that may be ordered returned" (R. 168). 
Hearing was held January 24, 1957, to allow claim-
ant~ to appear and put on evidence to show cause why 
the tangible personal property for which they made claim 
should not be forfeited by the court (R. 571). The record 
indicates that only the following claimants appeared: 
Libelees Feraco, Hooley, and Club Feraco; Cliff Krantz; 
Ethel ~I. Doheny: and X ational Cash Register Company 
(R. :171, 641). In compliance with hi~ rnemorandum de-
ci~ion, the court rnade son1e effort to determine what 
portion of the property seized was "restaurant" property 
and what portion of the property seized was "liquor" 
property (R. 571 ). Libelant, for the purpose of aiding the 
court, offered to ronrede that certain items were used 
primaril~· in the ~o-e<llled "restaurant business;" certain 
items wPrP used primarily in the illegal liquor business; 
and c·Prtain items were used in both (R. 574). Counsel 
for LilH'Iant, in hi~ pffnrts to aid the rourt, attempted to 
indir.atP tJw phy~ieallocation of the items in controversy. 
J n doing so, c·ounsPI stu ted to the court that it was done to 
aid thP rourt, but qualified his doing so by stating: 
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" ... in separating the items as we previously did this 
morning, that we are not consenting that they were not 
part and parcel of the illegal business ... " (R. 631, 639). 
During the hearing on the 24th day of January, 
Libelees Feraco, Club Feraco, Hooley, and Doheny of-
fered no testimony to su.stain their statutory burden of 
showing that "said tangible personal property or some 
parts thereof were not used for any purpose whatsoever 
in connection with the operation of the business con-
ducted on the premises where said personal property 
was seized" (See 32-8-20 Utah Code Annotated, 1953). 
Libelee Leonard Feraco "filed" an Affidavit with the 
court and all Libelees rested (R. 215, 572, 636). The 
court "cautioned" :Mr. Bridwell as to the Affidavit, 
stating "Mr. Bridwell, an affidavit filed is evidence for 
some purposes. It isn't regarded as-Inay I say-first-
class evidence in disputed matters because it isn't sub-
ject to cross exmnination and, for most purposes, affi-
davits are not received and considered as evidence on 
the vital issues of a matter in litigation. It is some-
what like hearsay evidence, because it isn't subject to 
testing by cro.ss examination. I make that com1nent for 
your consideration" (R. 636). 
Nothing in the record indicates that the purported 
Affidavit was ever received in evidence (R. 636). Its 
reception was objected to by Libelant (R. 636). In effect, 
other than certain limited testiinony offered by Cliff 
Krantz and certain limited testimony and docuinent~ of-
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fered by National Cash Register Company and certain 
contracts offered by Mrs. Doheny no testimony was of-
fered by Libelees to sustain their admitted burden of 
proof (R. 639-642). 
The court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Decree on the 29th day of January, 1957. 
In the decree, the court classified certain property as 
"restaurant" property and ordered that such property 
be returned to Libelees. The court classified certain 
property as "liquor" property and ordered that such 
property be forfeited and sold. The court, neither in 
its findings of fact nor in its conclusions of law, speci-
fically differentiated the property classified in the de-
cree and judgment (R. 187-204). 
February 1, 1957, Libelant filed with the court a 
''Motion for a New Trial as to the Return of Certain 
Tangible Personal Property" alleging (1) newly dis-
covered evidence ; ( 2) insufficiency of evidence to sup-
port the judgment to return certain property; and (3) 
error in law (R. 226). February 5, 1957, Libelant filed 
a "Motion to A1nend and Supplen1ent Findings of Fact 
and Conclusion of Law and J udg1nent,'' alleging the 
rea.sons for the nwtion and setting forth the proposed 
corrective mnendnu~nts (R. 237). Both n1otions were con-
sidered by the court on the 5th day of February, 1957 (R. 
266). The court, on the 9th day of February, 1957, de-
nied both nwtions of Libelant (R. 266). 
February 17, 1957, counsel for Libelees Hooley, 
10 
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Feraco and Club Feraco Inoved the court to set aside 
the judg1nent of the court which motion was denied (R. 
:282, 328). 
February 20, 1957, George Bridwell, counsel for 
Libelees, upon an oral ex-parte application, without no-
tice to Libelant, obtained an order for the sale of the 
forfeited property from Judge Martin Larson (R. 299). 
S.aid order was neither filed with nor issued by the Clerk 
of Court ( R. 327, 328, 329). No minute entry was made 
of said order (R. 327-329). It was neither sealed nor 
authenticated, nor was it directed to the person having 
custody of the property (R. 299). It was improperly 
posted (R. 305). 
March 2, 1957, the Sheriff of Salt Lake County sold 
for the sum of $10.00 the items declared forfeited to 
the State of Utah, including cash 1nany times in excess 
of $10.00 ( R. 305). 
March 6, 1957, Counsel for Libelant filed a "Motion 
to Quash and Declare of No Effect the Purported Order 
of Sale and the Purported Sale of Certain Personal 
Property" (R. 336). Filed and issued on the same day 
was "Petition and Order to Show Cause" (R. 292) . 
. March 7, 1957, Libelees filed a "Notice of Cross 
Appeal" (R. 298). 
March 19, 1957, the court heard arguments to quash 
the purported sale and motion for order to show cause, 
11 
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and the matter was taken under advisement (R. 330). 
The matter is still under advisement. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE CLASSIFICATION BY THE TRIAL JUDGE OF 
SEIZED PROPERTY AS EITHER "RESTAURANT" OR 
"LIQUOR" AND HIS A•CTION IN ORDERING THAT THE 
"RESTAURANT" PROPERTY BE RETURNED TO LIBEL-
EES WAS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND WAS 
CONTRARY TO LAW. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT LIBEL-
ANT'S MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT THE 
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
TO MODIFY THE JUDGMENT. 
POINT III. 
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS CANNOT BE RAISED 
FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
POINT IV. 
ACQUITTAL IN CRIMINAL ACTION HAS NO BEARING 




THE CLASSIFICATION BY THE TRIAL JUDGE OF 
SEIZED PROPERTY AS EITHER "RESTAURANT" OR 
"LIQUOR" AND HIS A•CTION IN ORDERING THAT THE 
"RESTAURANT" PROPERTY BE RETURNED TO LIBEL-
EES WAS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND WAS 
CONTRARY TO LAW. 
12 
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(a) The statute establishes a presumption that all 
tangible personal property on the prernises was used in 
connection with violation of the Utah Liquor Control 
Act and accordingly gives claimants the burden of prov-
ing to the satisfaction of the court that their property 
was not used for any purpose whatsoever in connection 
with the operation of the business conducted on the 
premises where said personal property was seized. 
The statute in question, Section 32-8-20, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, sets forth the proper procedure to be 
followed by the court following seizure, pursuant to 
Section 32-8-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Section 
32-8-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in part as 
follows: 
"At the time and place fixed in the notice 
the person named in the information, or any per-
son claiming any interest in such alcoholic bever-
ages, or tangible personal property, or any part 
thereof, may appear and show cause why the same 
should not be forfeited. If .any person shall so ap-
pear he shall become a party defendant in the 
cause and the court shall make a record thereof. 
*** If the court shall find from the evidence pre-
sented that violations of this act did occur upon 
the premise wherein said alcoholic beverages or 
other tangible personal property so seized by the 
arresting officer was located, then he shall also 
find that all tangible personal property so seized 
by said arresting officer which was located 
upon said premises was also used in connection 
with violation of this act and shall be forfeited as 
hereafter provided unless any of the claimants 
prove to the satisfaction of the court that said 
tangible personal property or some parts thereof 
13 
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were not used for any purpose whatsoever in con-
nection with the operation of the business con-
ducted on the premises where said personal 
property was seized *** ." (Italics added.) 
The above statute is simple and direct. Once find-
ing that a violation of the act has occurred in the prem-
ises in que.stion, the court has the mandatory duty under 
this statute to further find that all tangible personal 
property seized on the premises was used in connection 
with said violations. The only way a claimant can there-
after save his property from forfeiture is to come to 
court and prove that his property was not used for any 
purpose whatsoever in connection with the operation of 
the business conducted on the premises. (Emphasis 
added.) It can be noted at this point that the statute 
makes no mention of a claimant being required to show 
that his property was not connected with liquor. The 
statute requires a showing that such property was not 
connected with the business conducted on the premises. 
The interpretation of the afore1nentioned statute is so 
obvious as to m1ake it unnecessary to belabor the point 
further that once having found the Yiolation, the burden 
is on the claimant to show that his property falls without 
the confines of the statute. 
(b) The Libelees Feraco and Hooley and other 
claimants presented no evidence tending to show that 
any tangible personal property in Club Feraeo was not 
used for any purpose in connection with the operation 
of the business conducted thereon. 
The record of the first hearing at which the trial 
14 
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judge carne up with the conclusions that there were two 
types of property in Club Feraco, ''restaurant" property 
and "liquor" property, is completely barren of any evi-
dence presented on behalf of these Libelees tending to 
show even remotely that any property in the club fell 
out.side of the statute. The evidence at said hearing 
was confined primarily to the question of whether or 
not there had been an illegal sale of alcoholic beverage 
at Club Feraco at the time in question. The complete 
void in the record on thi.s point demanded a forfeiture 
of all property seized at Club Feraco at the time in ques-
tion. 
In the case of H ernenway q Moser C ornpany, et al 
v. Funk, 100 U. 72, 106 P. 2d 779, it was stated at page 
784, 
"Proof of the violation of the act in the ab-
sence of a contest is sufficient to justify a decision 
by the court against the property, or in case of 
a contest to compel the claimant to prove that his 
property w.as not so used in violation of the act, 
or as a part of the business wherein part of the 
business was a violation of the act; or that a busi-
ness in violation of the act was not conducted on 
the premises." 
In this case, the court interpreted the provisions of Chap-
ter 43, Par. 168, Laws of Utah, 1935, now Section 32-8-20, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The court in this case stated 
that the Liquor Control Act should be liberally con.strued 
in order to elirninate the evils of unlicensed and unlawful 
manufacture, sale and disposition of alcoholic beverages. 
15 
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The eourt imposed the burden on Libelees .as set forth 
Point I (a) supra. 
(c) At the initial hearing Libelant produced af-
firmative evidence to the effect that liquor was dispensed 
uniformily throughout the premise.s where the property 
in question was seized. 
At R. 438 and 439 the tes~tirnony of Ross Feraco, a 
former manager of Club Feraco, is contained in respect 
to the dispensing of liquor at the premises in question: 
"Q. Now is any other business conducted there? 
A. Food. 
Q. Food is served there 1 
A. That's right. 
Q. During that time that food was served to 
these people, do you know whether, on any 
occa.sion that you can recall, these people 
had a drink while they were eating their 
dinnerf 
A. If they bring their bottles in there and order 
their drinks, you bet. 
Q. They were served drinks at the table when 
eating? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, were people served n1ixed drinks any 
place else in the club other than the portion 
where they were eating? 
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A. Served anywhere in the club. 
Q. Anywhere in the club." 
This evidence concerning the connection of the res-
taurant to the liquor at the first hearing conclusively 
shows that the imaginary splitting of the premises into 
two parts is entirely unfounded. There was no contrary 
evidence. The restaurant area and dancing area are con-
tiguous and not separated (R. 393, 518-521). Ross Feraco 
testified that n1ixed drinks were served in all parts of the 
club whether it be re.staurant area, bar area, or dancing· 
area. This evidence shows as utterly ridiculous any 
atten1pt to artificially dissect one are.a of the club from 
another in regard to forfeiture of property. ·The statute 
aforesaid obviously makes the entire business conducted 
in the club as a whole illegal when the law is violated 
and accordingly subjects .all tangible personal property 
to forfeiture. Any other interpretation could only lead 
to confusion and frustration of the law. 
The testimony of Libelees showed that Club Feraco 
was not operated as a coinmercial enterprise but as a 
non-profit club with the sole purpose of providing enter-
tainment for meinber.s .and their guests. In view of this 
testimony the trial court's classification of a liquor busi-
ness and a restaurant business being conducted separate-
ly under the same roof appears to be even Inore erroneous 
(R. 520, 521). 
Libelant, after the initial he.aring, produced uncon-
troverted te.stimony of the illegal sale of alcoholic bev-
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erages in Club Feraco (R. 600-632). 
(d) The trial judge Inisinterpreted the stipulation 
agreeing to release certain items of personal property 
to Hemenway & Moser Cmnpany and read into said 
stipulation a sweeping admission by the Libelant that 
re.staurant property w.as not connected with the busi-
ness being conducted on the premises of Club Feraco, 
in violation of the Utah Liquor Control Act. 
Subsequent to the first hearing on this matter and 
after all of the evidence had been presented as to the 
violation .and any possible personal property falling 
without the statute, the Libelant, through its attorney, 
entered into a stipulation with claimant Hemenway & 
Moser Company and Libelees Feraco and Hooley to the 
effect that certain cigarette vending machines and ciga-
rettes within could be released to the said Hemenway 
& Moser Company (R. 145). 
The trial judge seized on certain language contained 
1n the stipulation to solve the question as to the for-
feiture of the seized property. The language which was 
used as the panacea to the problen1 was as follows (R. 
145): 
"2. That the .above described property does 
not in an~· way belong to s.aid Club Feraco and 
was kept or used only in connection "ith the 
restaurant and heer vending business conducted 
on the premises and \Y<ls not so kept or used in 
connection with any business that n1ay have been 
<'onducted on the premises in Yiolation of the 
Liquor Control Act of the State of Utah." 
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The trial court, in his opinion interpreted this lan-
guage as follows that there w.as no connection between 
the cafe or restaurant and the bar or liquor business. 
lt is exceedingly difficult to imagine how the trial 
court so interpreted the aforesaid stipulation. The pur-
pose of the stipulation was to release certain specific 
items of property which were not felt to be .a part of the 
business conduCJted on the premises. From this, the trial 
court felt that Libelant had stipulated that all property 
having anything to do with the serving of food was not 
a part of Club Feraco's business. This reasoning on the 
part of the trial court .also stems from a basic misunder-
standing of the provisions of Section 32-8-20, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, that items of property are exempt if 
they have nothing to do with liquor. It will be remem-
bered thaJt the statute places the burden on the claimant 
of proving "to the satisfaction of the court that s.aid 
tangible personal property or some parts thereof were 
not used for any purpose whatsoever in connection with 
the operaJtion of the business condu0ted on the premises 
where said personal property was seized." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The statute requires no connection with the business; 
it does not require a connection with liquor. Once the 
viol.ation is found, the entire business as such, is illegal, 
and all tangible personal property used in such business 
is subject to forfeiture. A claiinant Inust show no connec-
tion with the business and cannot be let off Inerely show-
ing no connection with liquor. 
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It will be remeinbered that Ross Feraco stated that 
liquor was dispensed in all parts of the club. The trial 
judge apparently overlooked this testimony when he 
ruled in his opinion that there was no evidence offered 
or given to show that the restaurant business was in any 
way a part of, or connected with, the liquor or bar busi-
ness. 
The trial judge obviously warped and stretched 
the stipulation as to certain specific items of property 
to an entire section of the illegal business conducted at 
Club Feraco. 
(e) Parties to the action cannot change the court's 
duties under the law by stipulation. 
The language of the statute regarding the procedure 
and burden in an in rem action for the forfeiture of prop-
erty is clear as to the duties of the trial court. The fol-
lowing excerpt frmn 32-8-20, r tah Code Annotated, 1953, 
indicate.s the particular duty of the trial court, after the 
finding of fact (Finding of Fart YI [R. 188] ) made 
by the court to the effect that there was a violation of 
the Utah Liquor Control Act. to-wit: 
"* * *If the court shall find from the evidence 
presented that violation of this act did occur upon 
the prmnise wherein said alcoholic beverages or 
other tangible personal property so seized,..by the 
arresting officer was located, then he shall also 
find that all tau!fiblc persoual property so seized 
by said arresting officer "·hirh was located upon 
said pren1ises was also used in connection with 
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violation of this act and shall be forfeited as here-
after provided, unless any of the claimants prove 
to the satisfaction of the court that said tangible 
personal property or smne parts thereof were not 
used for any purpose whatsoever in connection 
with the operation of the business conducted on 
the premises where said personal property was 
seized." (Emphasis added.) 
The trial court having made the initial finding that 
there was sale of liquor on the premises of Club Feraco 
in violation of the Utah Liquor Control Act, it must also 
find that all tangible personal property seized upon said 
premises was used in connection with the violation and 
must be forfeited. That claimants have the burden of 
proving that the tangible personal property seized by 
the officers at Club Feraco was not used for any purpose 
whatsoever in connection with the business conducted 
on the premises before the court is relieved of its duty. 
The claimants have failed to sustain their burden of 
proof as required in the above statute, therefore the 
seized property must be forfeited. 
The trial court, disregarding the mandatory lan-
guage of the statute and disregarding its finding of a 
violation of the Utah Liquor Control Act, stated that 
counsel had stipulated to the effect that the "restaurant" 
and "liquor" business conducted at Club Feraco had no 
connection, and concluded therefore, that "restaurant" 
property cannot be forfeited for a liquor violation. This 
is a most distorted conclusion to draw from said stipu-
lation. The stipulation is clearly for the purpose of aid-
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ing the court in making what was determined to be an 
proper release of property of one of the claimants. 
Its meaning must be confined to the wording thereof, 
which limits the extent of the stipulation narrowly. To 
stipulate that another claimant owned certain property 
and that the property was not used by Club Feraco in its 
busines;s, is not to stipulate that all property seized is of 
two kinds-"liquor" or "restaurant," nor is it to stipu-
late, as the trial court believes, that there was no connec-
tion as to all the property seized between the "restaurant" 
and "liquor" bu.siness. 
The single requirement of the statute, before seized 
property may be forfeited, following a finding of a vio-
lation, as the trial court here found, is that the property 
be "also used in connection with violation of this act." 
(32-8-20, U.C.A. 1953) Some evidence on this point is 
that of Ross Feraco to the effect that 1nixed drinks were 
served .anywhere in Club Feraco (R. 438, 439). Certainly, 
the entire record describes a picture of one establish-
ment-Club Feraco-engaged in selling food and drink, 
and furnishing entertainment for its members, but with 
no distinotion whatever that there were separate "busi-
nesses" for "restaurant" purposes and "liquor" purposes. 
The trial court erred in using the stipulation of the 
parties regarding the cigarette vending 1nachines and the 
contents thereof, as a 1neans of avoiding its statutory 
duty. The language of the stipulation is clearly restricted 
to the property listed therein and cannot fairly be taken 
to express the 1neaning concluded by the trial court. 
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However, whether accepting the view of the stipula-
tion taken by the trial court or that expressed in this 
brief, the sound reasoning of rnany courts indicates that 
the parties cannot by stipulation alter the statutory duty 
of the trial court. In the recent case of State v. Christen-
sen, 166 Kan. 152, 199 P. 2d -1:75, 479 (1948), the court 
said: 
"The authorities overwhelmingly support the 
conclusion we have felt compelled to reach in this 
case. The power of public officers and the juris-
diction of court.s are to be found in the statutes 
and n1ay not be conferred by stipulation or other-
wise. 14 Arn. Jr. 380, § 184; 21 C.J.S., Courts§ 35, 
page 45. Parties to litigation cannot validly stipu-
late as to what the law is, how a statute is to be 
construed, or what its effect is (50 Am. J ur. 607, 
§ 5, 92 A.L.R. 664, 669-670) at least as to matters 
of public concern (50 Am. J ur. 607, § 4; 608, § 5 ; 
92 A.L.R. 666). 'The proper administration of 
the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipu-
lation of parties.' Young v. United States, 315 
U.S. 257, ... Even in civil actions it is held that 
the parties may not stipulate for a determination 
in a manner contrary to the statutes. In re Meri-
dith's Estate, 275 Mich. 278, 266 N.W. 351, 104 
A.L.R. 348." 
The case of In re Meredith's Estate, 275 Mich. 278, 
266 N.W. 351, 355 (1936), which is cited by the Christen-
sen case above seems to be a leading authority for this 
proposition and states as follows: 
"Parties cannot by agreement .supersede the 
essential regulations made by law for the investi-
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gatwn of causes, and by stipulation set aside the 
statutory method prescribed for determining the 
mental capacity of the testator. Harris v. Sweet-
land, 48 Mich. 110, 11 N.W. 830." 
"Parties even to a civil cause may not stipu-
late for the detennination of the same by the trial 
court in a manner contrary to the statutes or rules 
of court. Kohn v. Columbia Nat. Bank, 165 Ill. 
316, 46 N .E. 208. 
"Much less is a stipulation valid which changes 
the method of procedure in proceedings in rem 
and submits the detennination of the mental com-
petency of a testator to one man other than the 
pro bate judge." 
This principle has been recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court in the case of Swift and Company v. 
Hocking Valley R. Company_. 243 r.S. 281, 289 (1916): 
"If the stipulation is to be treated as an 
agreement concerning the legal effect of admitted 
facts, it is obviously inoperative: since the court 
cannot be controlled by .agree1nent of counsel on a 
subsidiary question of law .... ·The duty of this 
court, as of every judicial tribunal, is limited to 
detennining rights of persons or of property. 
which are actually controverted in the particular 
case before it . . . No stipulation of parties or 
counsel, whether in the case before the court or in 
any other ease, can enlarge the power. or affect 
the duty of the court in this regard." 
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Ordinarily the parties are bound by stipulations of 
fae.t which are e1nployed in an evidentiary sense .and not 
as conclusions binding on the courts, however, the courts 
mar discharge stipulations entered into irnprovidently 
in order to accmnplish justice. See Malone v. Bianchi, 
Mass., 61 N.E. 2d 1 ( 1945) and further citations listed 
therein. The intent of the parties in entering into the 
stipulation should be the controlling criterion for those 
stipulations that are found to be of binding effect. This 
concept was recognized in the case of First-Mechanics 
Nat. Bank v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 117 F. 2d 127, 
131 (1940): 
"This is clearly a misinterpretation of the 
purport of the stipulation .... The stipulation 
was not intended to be nor could it properly be 
construed as being substantive proof of the fact 
of mistake as .alleged .... Consequently, the Board 
was not precluded thereby from drawing a conclu-
sion to the contrary from the admitted facts. The 
legal effect of the indisputable facts, appearing of 
record, was for the Board, and for this court on 
review, regardless of the stipulation." (citations 
omitted) 
The overall intent of the parties has been looked to even 
when the stipulation is obviously inconsistent with the 
allegations later made. See State v. Martin, 23 Mo. 1, 
129 S.W. 931, 936 (1910), a state liquor prosecution in 
which the stipulation that a drink was non-intoxicating 
was subverted by later testimony which negated the 
stipulation. 
Irrespective of the duty of the trial court and the 
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intent of the parties~ it if3 \vell recognized that the parties 
cannot determine the law hy stipulation. In a criminal 
action, State v. Green, 167 Wash. 266, 9 P. 2d 62, 63 
(1932), it was stated that: 
"If we _should permit the parties by stipula-
tion or agreement to determine the law, we might 
establish precedents which would be embarrass-
ing." 
As was declared in Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 
259 ( 1941), and quoted in many decisions and annota-
tions: 
"The public interest that a re·sult be reached 
which promotes a well-ordered society is foremost 
in every criminal proceeding. That interest is en-
trusted to our con.sideration and protection as well 
as to that of the enforcing officers. Furthermore, 
our judgments are precedents, and the proper 
administration of the criminal law cannot be left 
merely to the stipulation of the parties." (citations 
omitted) 
While the instant ease is not exclusively a criminal 
action, it is based upon the enforcen1ent of sanction aris-
ing fron1 the illegal sale of liquor, a crime. This is not 
determinative, however, since the doctrine that the par-
ties cannot detern1ine the law by stipulation is applicable 
to civil suits as well. In the case of X orth Platte Lodge 
985, B.P.O.E. v. Board of Equali.zation,, 125 Neb. 841, :252 
N.vV. 313, 31+ (1934), the court stated the following in 
con.sidering the question of stipulation against the public 
interest in a civil suit: 
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"The decision of these rnatters will necessarily 
affect the substantial interest of the general pub-
lic. This stipulation emphasizes the necessity and 
importance of adherence in this class of cases to 
the following commonly accepted principles of 
procedure, viz: 'While litigants have the undoubt-
ed right to stipulate as to the facts, it is very 
generally held that it is not competent for them to 
stipulate as to what the law is so as to bind the 
court, and that such stipulations will be disre-
garded. Decisions of questions of law must rest 
upon the judgment of the court, uninfluenced by 
stipulations of the parties or counsel ... as to the 
existence of a law, as to its validity or invalidity 
. . . as to the legal conclusion from a given state 
of fact.s as to the legal effect of a contract. 60 
C.J. 50." 
In other vvords, "**':« the people of the state are entitled 
to know what is the law on public questions, rather than 
what we find it to be upon agreement of parties." Ford 
v. Dilley, 174 Iowa 243,250; 156 N.W. Rep. citation, N.W. 
513, 517. A sin1ilar problern confronted the court in In 
re Dardis' Will, 135 Wis. 457, 115 N.W. 332, 333 (1909), 
wherein it was said: 
" ... the proceeding to probate a will is a pro-
ceeding in rem, binding all the world, and in which 
even public welfare and policy is involved. The 
view that public interest requires that a valid will 
be established, independently of the wish of those 
parties specifically named therein, is evidenced by 
various statutes in this ,state . . a positive duty is 
imposed both upon the county judge as a public 
officer . . . to take steps to bring the question of 
its validity before the proper probate court .... 
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[p. 334] All these steps are imposed by law 
wholly independent of the control of those private-
ly interested. They evince a clear recognition and 
declaration by the Legislature that there is a 
public policy involved in the establishment of 
every legally executed will. ***" 
* * * 
" ... courts cannot be compelled to disregard 
to accommodate the wishes of some or even all 
parties having pecuniary interest in the property. 
". . . the considerations which we have above 
suggested of the possible interest of unknown par-
ties and of the existence of a public policy to pro-
tect them. . . . This conclusion seems to be sup-
ported by the great weight of authority." ( cita-
tions omitted). 
* * * 
"We conclude that the stipulation in this case 
could not control the duty which the probate court 
owed to the public, and perhaps to the testator, 
to adjudicate as to the legal existence of the pro-
pounded document as a will - to establish its 
status." 
For a more recent case see People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 
90 N.E. 2d 213, 216 (1950), "It is the province of the 
court to detennine what the legislature meant. . . . ., 
That a strong public intere~t is established in the 
enforce1nent of the sate liquor law~ i~ patent in the stat-
utes and the deeisions of this state. Duties are imposed 
on the courts with a legitin1ate purpose in 1nind by the 
legislatun', and that purpose is to safeguard the public 
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interest in the outcorne of the decisiOns. That these 
duties should not be disregarded lightly is obvious. 
Rather than construe a stipulation that flaunts such 
duties broadly it should be construed strictly and when 
found in serious conflict with the duty or any public 
interest it should be disregarded. 
There are other principles which declare that the 
stipulation in the instant case was either invalid ab initio 
or at least irnproperly ernployed by the trial court. It is 
established beyond reasonable question that the parties 
cannot bind the court by stipulating as to the conclusions 
to be drawn frmn the facts, Minneapolis Brewing Co. v. 
Merritt, 143 F. Supp. 146, 149 (1956): 
''A stipulation of material facts is ordinarily 
proper, but parties cannot bind the court by stipu-
lation as to the law." (citations omitted) "Nor can 
they do so by stipulation as to the legal effect of 
admitted facts." (citations omitted) 
Tyan v. KSTP, Inc., ______ Minn. ______ , 77 N.W. 2d 200, 205 
(1956): 
"We are not bound to treat the stipulations 
entered into as an agreement concerning the legal 
effect of .admitted facts. The stipulations would 
not be operative in that regard. The court cannot 
be controlled by agreement of counsel on a sub-
sidiary que.stion of law .... This court must de-
cide questions of law here involved, uninfluenced 
by stipulations of the parties or of counsel." 
Valdez v. Taylor Automobile Company, ______ Cal. ______ , 278 
P. 2d 91, 97 (1954): 
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" ... lt was a stipulation as to the legal effect of 
the facts-a conclusion of law. And as we shall 
see it was an erroneous conclusion from the facts 
and as such is not binding on this court .... " 
Ex Parte Higgs, ______ Okla. ______ , 263 P. 2d 752, 761 (1953): 
". . . in interpreting a legislative act courts 
are not compelled to abdicate to the stipulations 
of the parties." 
See also Hahn v. lvational Casualty Compally) 64 Idaho 
684, 136 P. 2d 739, 741 (1943); Ex Parte Day, 127 Tex. 
Criminal Rpts. 367, 76 S.\Y. 2d 1060, 1065 (1934). The 
stipulation in the instant case wa.s one which, as inter-
preted by the trial court, established the ultimate facts 
of the case in regards to certain property, i.e., was the 
property connected with the illegal liquor business con-
ducted on the premises. 
In the case of Platt v. D n ited States, 163 F. :2d 165, 
168 (1947), the Federal court had this to say about this 
type of stipulation: 
""It i.s doubtful if the staten1ent by appellant's 
attorney in respect to this n1atter can be construed 
.as a stipulation as to a finding of fact, but, in any 
event, parties 1nay not stipulate the findings of 
fact upon \\~hich conclusions of law and the judg-
ment of the court are to be based. Parties may by 
stipulation establish evidentiary facts to obviate 
the necessit~- of offering proof, but based thereon 
the court n1ust 1 tself find the ultin1ate facts upon 
which the conclusions of law and the judgn1ents 
are based." 
Under the !'acts as deduced at the trial, the stipulation, 
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as interpreted by the trial court, is contrary to both the 
facts and the law. To conclude that all the property used 
in the "restaurant" business could have no connection 
with the liquor business is ab.surd. This same anamoly 
was confronted in the case of People v. Shifrin, 198 Misc. 
348, 101 N.Y.S. 2d 613, 616 (1950): 
"The defendant's contention that the place of 
business is a farmers' market and therefore ex-
empt from the prohibitions of the statute has no 
pre.suasive force .... It is the type of business 
conducted which governs and the stipulation c.an-
not change the fact or the law; neither can the 
parties by stipulation make ineffective the opera-
tion of the statute where in fact a violation exists." 
(citations omitted). 
In the instant case, only three of the cl.aimants in the 
action were parties to the stipulation. It is well settled 
law that a stipulation cannot bind those not a party to it. 
In Arnett v. Throop, 75 Idaho 331, 272 P. 2d 308, 310 
(1954), it was recognized that: 
"A valid stipulation binds the p.arties there-
to, but parties to an action cannot by stipulation 
affect third parties' rights and persons not parties 
to the stipulations." (citations omitted) 
For a federal case in accord see Kneeland v. Luce, 141 
U.S. 437 (1891). In the case of In re Dardis' Will, 135 
Wis. 457, 115 N.W. 332, (1908), the court held that the 
fact that all the parties in interest did not sign the stipu-
lation was a valid reason not to enforce the stipulation. 
31 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Especially is thi~ so in an in rem action where the rights 
to property are settled as to the whole world; a few can-
not stipulate away the rights of others who might have 
an interest in the property. This is the effect of the trial 
court interpretation of the stipulation in the instant case. 
Since thi.s question is one apparently of first impres-
sion in this state, the appellant has attempted to present 
the law to the court for consideration. It appears to be 
without question that the actions of the trial court in 
respect to the stipulation made therein was improper. 
Since the conclusion establishes a rather dangerous pre-
cedent of authorizing public officials by direct action of 
the courts by liberal interpretation to stipulate away the 
rights of the public as established by legislation, the re-
sult warrants serious consideration. Additional support 
for the conclusions requested herein may be found in 
an extensive annotation on the subject in 92 A.L.R. 663. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT LIBEL-
ANT'S MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT THE 
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
TO MODIFY THE JUDGMENT. 
The court made numerous findings on immaterial 
matters for which there is insufficient support in the 
rHcord. It failed to n1ake certain petinent findings for 
which there is runple support in the record. 
(a) The court u1ade nu1nerous findings on im-
1naterial1natters which, even if nmterial, find insufficient 
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support in the record. Such "findings" encumber the 
record, confuse the issue, .and offer no valid basis for any 
conclusion of law. Examples of such are Findings of Fact 
Number X and XI which deal with purported conversa-
tions of :Mr. Bridwell and the county attorney, and Mr. 
Bridwell and the chief of police (R. 189). Additional 
examples are Findings XY, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, 
XX, XXI, XXII, which have to do with alleged damage 
to the seized properly (R. 190-192). Another example is 
that part of Finding XXVI, which recites a request by 
Libellee Club Feraco addressed to the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue for cancellation of a federal alcohol tax stamp 
(Retail Dealers Tax Stmnp) after the date of the alleged 
offense (R. 193). 
(b) The court failed to make certain pertinent 
findings for which there is an1ple support in the record. 
The court f.ailed to find that during the period Club 
Feraco had a retail liquor dealers tax stamp that it al-
lowed per.sons to have, hold, store and posses liquor on 
the premises of Club Feraco. (Proposed Amendment 
Number 20 a and b [R. 239, 240] ). The court failed to 
find that no evidence was introduced by Club Fer.aco, 
nor any other claimant that the tangible personal prop-
erly, nor any parts thereof were not used for any purpose 
whatsoever in connection with the operation of the busi-
ness conducted on the premises of Club Feraco (R. 187-
204). ~or did it find that evidence was introduced that 
there was no connection with the tangible personal prop-
erty and the busine.ss conducted on the premises, which 
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finding would certainly be necessary to sustain its order 
to return property (R. 187-204). The court erred in mak-
ing conclusions IV and V (R. 193, 194). The conclusions 
are neither Inaterial nor relevant, nor do they have ade-
quate foundation in fact. They, in fact, are conclusions 
manufactured out of the whole cloth and have no bear-
ing on the issues in this ca.se. 
The court erred in failing to modify its judgment in 
at least three particulars: It erred in directing the Sher-
iff of Salt Lake County to sell the forfeited property; 
it erred in directing the Sheriff of Salt Lake County to 
destroy the seized alcoholic beverages; it erred in direct-
ing that each party bear its own costs (R. 195-204). 
The officer directed to sell the forfeited property, 
had neither possession nor control of the forfeited prop-
erty. He is not authorized by statute to sell said property. 
The court issued its warrant of attachment to Officer 
Philip Ralph Caldwell, com1nanding him to hold safely 
the property so seized in hi.s possession .. until discharged 
by law." 32-8-24, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as 
follows: 
"If the property, except alcoholic beverage 
so seized, can be used for lawful purposes and in 
the discretion of the court the public interest 
would be ~erYed by selling instead of de.stroying 
the same, the court shall direct the office'!· to sell 
such property at public auction * • *" (Emphasis 
added.) 
The offieer referred to throughout the Liquor Con-
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trol Act is the seizing officer to which the court issues its 
warrant to hold said property safely. This is further 
born out by the language in the same section, wherein 
the statute provides "whenever it shall be finally decided 
that any alcoholic beverages or other property so seized 
.are not liable to forfeiture, the court by whom such final 
decision shall be rendered shall issue a written order to 
the officer having the sa1ne in custody or to some other 
peace office, to restore said alcoholic beverages * * * ." 
The distinction between the officer holding the property 
and other peace officers is clearly distinguishable in this 
section. The case of Woolum v. Commonwealth, 295 S.W. 
1029, decided by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, June 
24, 1927, is a c.ase wherein the Sheriff was authorized 
by statute to conduct forfeiture sales. The court ordered 
the Chief of Police to sell a forfeited automobile. The 
court therein states at 1030 : 
"In adjudging a forfeiture of appeilants car, 
the lower court directed that it be advertised and 
sold by the chief of police of Harland. This w.as 
error, as section 2554al2, Kentucky Statutes, 
provides that all such sales shall be made by the 
Sheriff." 
We submit that the court was in error in directing 
the sheriff to sell the forfeited property. The seizing 
officer and only the seizing officer was entitled to carry 
out such sale. We submit that the s.ame reasoning applies 
in relationship to the destruction of seized alcoholic 
beverages, and that the court was in error in directing 
an officer not authorized by .s~tatute to do so. 
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POINT III. 
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS CANNOT BE RAISED 
14'0R FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
Points III, IV, V and VI of Libelees and Respond-
ents and Cross Appellants brief improperly attempt to 
place before this court questions of constitutionality 
never raised in the trial court. Timely assertions of 
Libelee's intention to que.stion the statutes in the Liquor 
Control Act, under which the proceeding was conducted, 
were never rnade, nor were any protective rights of per-
son and property guaranteed by the Utah and Federal 
Constitutions interposed in defense at any stage of the 
proceeding. The failure of Libelees to raise such ques-
tions at the earliest opportunity, constitutes a complete 
waiver thereof. It is too late, at this stage, the final 
chapter of the case, to complain, although we are forced 
to admit that opposing counsel has indeed complained in 
superlatives. 
The law is clearly and succinctly stated in W illough-
by v. lVilloughby, 178 Kan. 62, 283 P. 2d 428, at 432, as 
follows: 
"Defendant raises for the first time on this 
appeal the question of the constitutionality of 
section 60-1518. By his cross-petition, he sought 
affirmative relief under this statute. At no time 
did he question the constitutionality of the statute 
in the court below, either in his pleadings or on 
his motion for new trial. But on the contrary, on 
his theory of the ease the issues were narrowed 
and tried solely upon the rights of the parties 
under the rnentioned statute. It is the general 
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rule that when a litigant desire.s to question the 
constitutionality of a statute involved in a case, 
he should do so at the earliest opportunity, or it 
will be considered waived. Owen v. Mutual Bene-
fit Health & Accident A~s'n, 171 Kan. 457, 233 P. 
2d 706. A constitutional right rnay be forfeited 
in civil as well as criminal cases by the failure to 
make tinrely as.sertion of the right before a tribun-
al having jurisdiction to determine it. Y.akus v. 
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 660, 88 L. 
Ed. 834. A party rnay waive his right to question 
the constitutionality of a statute by proceeding 
under it. 11 Am. J ur. 772; see, also, 16 C.J.S., 
Constitutional Law, § 96, p. 225; Missionary Bap-
tist State Convention v. Wimberly Chapel Baptist 
Church, 170 K.an. 684, 228 P. 2d 540; Stelling v. 
Kansas City, 85 l{an. 397, 116 P. 511. Inasmuch 
as defendant predicated his defense and asked 
affirmative relief under the mentioned statute, 
and at no time questioned its constitutionality in 
the trial court, either by pleading or motion for 
new tri.al, it does not lie within his mouth at this 
late date to question the same on appellate review. 
Accordingly, the question is not before this court." 
Even assuming constitutional questions may be raised 
initially in the Supreme Court, the Liquor Control Act 
has pas.sed the scrutiny of the Utah Supreme Court on the 
question of its validity on numerous occasions. 
See Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 
89 Utah 183, 51 P. 2d 645; Hemenway & Moser Company 
v. Funk, 100 Utah 72, 106 P. 2d 779; Utah Mfrs.' Ass'n. 
v. Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 23 P. 2d 229, and State v. Kallas, 
97 Utah 492, 94 P. 2d 414. 
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POINT IV. 
ACQUITTAL IN CRIMINAL ACTION HAS NO BEARING 
ON FORFEI'TURE OF PROPERTY UNDER LIBEL OF IN-
FORMATION. 
Counsel for Libelees, Respondents and Cross Ap-
pellants states in Point II of his brief: "The trial court 
abused its equity discretion in refusing to set aside its 
judgment of sale and forfeiture of property because of 
the acquittal of Mary Hooley and Leonard Feraco of the 
very crime upon which the seizure of all property was 
predicated. " 
Counsel's argument was answered by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah in the year 1918, in the case of 
State v. Certain Intoxicating Liquors, et al., 177 P. 235, 
236, wherein the court stated: 
"The acquittal of the defendant in the muni-
cipal court of Ogden City had no bearing on the 
issues involved in this action. This proceeding 
was directed wholly against the liquors in the 
interests of the public, not for the purpose of 
subjecting the defendant Laucirica to any penal-
ties, nor was he placed in jeopardy before the 
court by becoming a party to the action. There-
fore the in1paneling of a jury because of the de-
fendant's appearance and voluntarily becoming 
.a party to the action, on the ground of his claiming 
an interest in the liquors and pleading an acquit-
tal in a fonner proceeding in another tribunal in 
which he had been prosecuted crilninally, would 
have rendered these proceedings farcical." 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully subn1itted that the Judgment of the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, as to 
the return of certain items of personal property to Club 
Feraco should be reversed and that Libelees, Respond-
ents and Cross Appellants Appeal should be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANK E. MOSS 
County Attorney 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
PETER F. LEARY 
BRUCE S. JENKINS 
Deputy County Attorneys 
S.alt Lake County, Utah 
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